Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation

نویسندگان

چکیده

When firms collude and charge supracompetitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. litigation cost is low, accept as just another of doing business, whereas when high, lower price to deter litigation. Class action modeled a mechanism that allows plaintiffs attorneys obtain economies scale. We show class actions, firms’ incentive block them, may or not be socially desirable. Agency problems, settlement, fee-shifting, treble damages, public enforcement, sustaining collusion through repeat play are also considered. (JEL D21, D24, D82, K15, K21, K41, L40)

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

De Facto Detrebling: the Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation

Antitrust law provides that successful private plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages. Despite this, in antitrust class action litigation, courts have subtly dismantled the treble damage regime by manipulating the standard for reviewing proposed settlements. Federal law requires judicial approval of class action settlements in order to ensure that the class members’ interests are adequately ...

متن کامل

Private Antitrust Enforcement Revisited: The Role of Private Incentives to Report Evidence to the Antitrust Authority

It is commonly believed that the possibility to sue privately for antitrust damages decreases the number of type II errors in enforcement at the cost of creating more type I errors. We extend the analysis by taking into account the fact that private parties often submit evidence during public prosecution. Such parties consider private suit as a partial substitute for public prosecution, as both...

متن کامل

Negotiation with Private Information: Litigation and Strikes

I am glad to contribute this twelfth annual lecture celebrating the memory of Nancy Schwartz. Many of us remember the years in the 1970s when the most exciting developments in the theory of industrial organization were in the series of articles by the prolific team of Morton Kamien and Nancy Schwartz. Nancy’s work with Mort initiated a renaissance based on explicit analysis of strategic behavio...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1945-7669', '1945-7685']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200059