China’s ODI Motivations, Political Risk, Institutional Distance and Location Choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Political Motivations ∗
Are politicians motivated by policy outcomes or by the perks of office? The answer to this question is central to understanding the behavior of office holders and the policies they produce. Despite the question’s importance, however, the existing literature is not well suited to provide an answer. To shed light on the issue of political motivations I exploit a basic fact: to hold office, one mu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics Letters
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2162-2078,2162-2086
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2014.47068