CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL REGIMES: A GLOBAL EVIDENCE
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we explore the connection between Central Bank Independence (CBI) and inflation under alternative political regimes. We formulate a predictive model that accommodates CBI in analysis of thereafter regroup countries based on choice regimes as well level development. find has statistically significant negative effect adopting full democratic partial autocratic regimes; but are insignificant operating The results leading to conclusion robust different levels
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Buletin ekonomi moneter dan perbankan
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1410-8046']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v25i2.2004