Can Rumors and Other Uninformative Messages Cause Illiquidity ?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Can Rumors and Other Uninformative Messages Cause Illiquidity ?
In the model, a group of investors are invited to participate to a high-yield collective project. The project succeeds only if a minimum participation rate is reached. Before taking their decision, investors receive a vague statement about the outcome of a past investment decision. If investors believe that the message has an impact on the beliefs of the others, the problem can be analyzed as a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2312293