منابع مشابه
Biased Beliefs and Imperfect Information
Biased Beliefs and Imperfect Information We perform an incentivized experiment designed to assess the accuracy of beliefs about characteristics and decisions. Subjects are asked to declare some specific choices and characteristics with different levels of observability from an external point of view, and typically formed through real world experiences. From the less observable mobile phone purc...
متن کاملDynamic Contracting under Imperfect Public Information and Asymmetric Beliefs∗
We develop a dynamic principal–agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs, asymmetric risk attitudes, complementary actions by both parties, and inter-temporal adverse selection arising from the agent’s unobservable actions interact to affect optimal dynamic contracts. Our continuous-time formulation of the model, which features both “hidden actions” and “hidden...
متن کاملEmpirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation
Let (xn)n be a process with values in a finite set X and law P , and let yn = f(xn) be a function of the process. At stage n, pn = P (xn | x1, . . . ,xn−1), element of Π = ∆(X), is the belief of a perfect observer of the process on its realization at stage n. A statistician observing y1, . . . ,yn’s holds a belief en = P (pn | x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ ∆(Π) on the possible predictions of the perfect obs...
متن کاملReputation and Imperfect Information
A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that in multistage “games,” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough” or “benevolent” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten’s finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated priso...
متن کاملThe Cushioning Benefits of Biased Beliefs
We present a model of dynamic investment and production when producers may have biased beliefs in which they overextrapolate recent demand conditions into the future. We point out that in a volatile industry, while biased beliefs lead firms to make sub-optimal investment decisions in the short-run, they can be beneficial in the long-run by counteracting the general trend in the industry, “cushi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.020