Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Being Realistic about Reasons
In my first lecture I listed seven questions about reasons that seemed to require answers. These were: Relational Character: Reasons are reasons for an agent. How is this relational character to be understood? Ground of Truth: In virtue of what are claims about reasons true, when they are true? Does the idea that claims about reasons are true or false, independent of our opinions about them, an...
متن کاملDoes Rationality Give Us Reasons?
Most of us take it for granted that we ought to be rational—to have the bundle of dispositions and abilities that constitute the faculty of rationality. Most of us also take it for granted that we ought to satisfy various individual requirements of rationality: we ought not to believe it is Monday and also believe it is not Monday; we ought to intend to catch the 12.50, if we intend to get to a...
متن کاملSOME REASONS about MOTION PHOTONS
In the article the motion of photons is reviewed in connection with miscellaneous properties of light. At first we shall be determined at sizes of photons more precisely to present, with what we deal. As the mechanical moment of a photon on coils of a screw line makes h , and the own mechanical moment in 1/α=137.0391 times is less, we can take advantage of the formula Sph=h /137.0391, and mass ...
متن کاملReason, Reasons, and Reasoning: A Constructivist Account of Human Rationality
The concept of rationality has its roots in a historic philosophical conception of human beings as creatures of reason. To act on the basis of reason is to act on the basis of reasons, which in turn implies a process of reasoning. An objectivist conception of rationality sees its essence as lying in the use of reasoning processes that conform to appropriate logical norms. A subjectivist concept...
متن کاملReason Claims and Contrastivism about Reasons∗
In this paper I argue for contrastivism about reasons. Just as contrastivism about causation and knowledge hold that ‘cause’ and ‘knows’, respectively, express relations with argument places for sets of alternatives, contrastivism about reasons holds that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. Some consideration might be a reason for an action relative t...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0031-8205,1933-1592
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12518