منابع مشابه
A Bayesian Clearing Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent valuations and market prices such that clearing prices become maximum a posteriori estimates given observed agent valuations. This generative model then forms ...
متن کاملCombinatorial Auctions: A Survey
Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes and furniture. Because of complementarities (or substitution effects) between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets or bundles of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or co...
متن کاملExperiments on Combinatorial Auctions
This paper contains the description of experiments done so far in the combinatorial auction scenario. We describe the computee side and the society side. In this context we introduce also external objects providing services to the computees themselves, and in particular implementing a complex optimization algorithm. Experimental results are given for a traditional combinatorial auction and for ...
متن کاملEfficient Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
This survey considers the following setting. A seller wants to sell a set of indivisible goods. A set of buyers are interested in buying the goods. Buyers have private values for bundles of goods they are interested in buying. The seller’s objective is to allocate the goods to the buyers efficiently (maximizing the total utility of buyers). Since the values of buyers are private information, th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the ACM
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0004-5411,1557-735X
DOI: 10.1145/2835172