Bargaining power and information in SME lending
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Understanding SME Finance: Determinants of Relationship Lending
Much of the existing literature in small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) finance surveys the impact of borrower and lender characteristics on firms’ credit availability, and it has already been established that there is a positive link between the strength of firm-bank relationship and the level of credit availability. In this paper, I focus on what determines the strength of relationship, me...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Small Business Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0921-898X,1573-0913
DOI: 10.1007/s11187-010-9311-6