Bargaining in Patent Licensing with Inefficient Outcomes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining in Patent Licensing with Ine cient Outcomes
Amonopoly incumbent faces an outside innovator who holds a new technology which has no industrial value to the monopolist but allows a pro table entry. The monopolist is willing to pay for the IP of the technology more than any entrant, in an attempt to limit entry. Still, the innovator may sell a number of licenses before bargaining with the monopolist, even though this will reduce the bargain...
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We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royalties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete tech...
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By formulating negotiations about licensing payments as cooperative games without side payments, we investigate stable bargaining outcomes in licensing a cost-reducing technology of an external patent holder to oligopolistic firms producing a homogeneous product under two licensing policies: fee and royalty. The final bargaining outcome in fee licensing is uniquely determined, because the NTU b...
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We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a Cournot market. Our results are as follows: Under each permissible coalition structure including the grand coalition, the patent holder can extract the entire profits of all licensees in the bargaining set for a coalition structure when the number of firms is large, so the optim...
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Considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as the bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The cores for coalition structures are empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give the necessary and sufficient condition for the core (for the grand coalition) ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Industrial Organization
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0889-938X,1573-7160
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-020-09755-1