Automated construction of bounded-loss imperfect-recall abstractions in extensive-form games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Constructing Imperfect Recall Abstractions to Solve Large Extensive-Form Games
Extensive-form games are an important model of finite sequential interaction between players. The size of the extensive-form representation is, however, often prohibitive and it is the most common cause preventing deployment of game-theoretic solution concepts to real-world scenarios. The state-of-the-art approach to solve this issue is the information abstraction methodology. The information a...
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Imperfect-recall abstraction has emerged as the leading paradigm for practical large-scale equilibrium computation in incomplete-information games. However, imperfect-recall abstractions are poorly understood, and only weak algorithm-specific guarantees on solution quality are known. In this paper, we show the first general, algorithm-agnostic, solution quality guarantees for Nash equilibria an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103248