منابع مشابه
Auctions with entry and resale
We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders possess twodimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale affects both entry and bidding, and, in particular, ...
متن کاملAuctions with Entry and Resale: The Case with Continuous Heterogeneous Entry Costs
We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders possess twodimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale induces motivation for both speculative entry and ba...
متن کاملAuctions with synergy and resale
We study a sequential auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. We find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions: Under the monopoly offer, there does not exist...
متن کاملAsymmetric Auctions with Resale
In a first-price auction, asymmetries among bidders typically result in inefficient allocations— that is, the winner of the auction may not be the person who values the object the most. This inefficiency creates a motive for post-auction resale, and when bidders take resale possibilities into account, their bidding behavior is affected as well. Standard models of such auctions, by and large, im...
متن کاملThe impact of resale on entry in second price auctions
This paper investigates the effect of resale allowance on entry strategies in a second price auction with two bidders whose entries are sequential and costly. We first characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies. We then show that there exists a unique threshold such that if the reseller’s bargaining power is greater (less) than the threshold, resale allowance causes the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.006