Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanismsfor auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valua-tions we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties fordivisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanismthat achieves this for either divisible or i...
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We show that the the unit demand auction introduced by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [5] is incentive compatible even when bidders have budget constraints. Furthermore we show that myopic bidding is an ex post equilibrium. Finally, we show that any other incentive compatible which always outputs a competitive equilibrium (envy free) must coincide with the DGS auction.
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In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only natural equilibrium and is unique under a refinement of subgame perfect equilibria. We show certain interesting properties of this equilibrium; for instance,...
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Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource allocation problem as a market with vendor and buyer agents participating in a multi-item auction. The agents exhibit different a...
متن کاملAuctions with Budget Constraints
In a combinatorial auction k different items are sold to n bidders, where the objective of the seller is to maximize the revenue. The main difficulty to find an optimal allocation is due to the fact that the valuation function of each bidder for bundles of items is not necessarily an additive function over the items. An auction with budget constraints is a common special case where bidders gene...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/2818351