منابع مشابه
Auction Theory for Auction Design
* Paper to appear as Chapter 1 in the book " Auctioning Public Assets " edited by Maarten Janssen, to be published by Cambridge University Press. We are grateful to Maarten for inviting us to write this survey. Preparing the survey has made us painfully aware of the gaps in our knowledge of the auction literature and we apologize for all errors and omissions. Tilman Börgers gratefully acknowled...
متن کاملAuction Design and Favoritism
The theory of auctions has ignored the fact that often auction designers, not the principal, design auctions In a multi attribute auction, the auction designer may bias his subjective evaluation of quality or distort the relative weights of the various attributes to favor a specific bidder, an ancient concern in the procurement of weapons, in the auctioning of government contracts and in the pu...
متن کاملAuction Design Goals
Assume a set of n ≥ 2 agents participating in an auction for one good. We adopt the IPV model, so that each agent i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} has value vi drawn from continuous distribution Fi, with support Ti = [v i, v i] for some v i, v i ∈ R+, which describes how much they value the good.1 We call this environment single-parameter, because 1 For simplicity, we sometimes assume symmetry, so that F...
متن کاملCombinatorial auction design.
Combinatorial auctions allow for more expressive bidding in which participants can submit package bids with logical constraints that limit allowable outcomes. This type of auction can be useful when participants' values are complementary or when participants have production and financial constraints. However, combinatorial auctions are currently rare in practice. The main problems confronted in...
متن کاملAuction Design without Commitment
We study auction design when parties cannot commit to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game any (finite) number of times and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. The mechanism is playable in truthful stratgies if the seller can commit to implement the outcomes of the mechanism. A consistency and one-deviation property are defined that characterize the selle...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Regulatory Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0922-680X,1573-0468
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-018-9358-x