Are Propositions Essentially Representational?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Intersecting Families are Essentially Contained in Juntas
A family J of subsets of {1, . . . , n} is called a j-junta if there exists J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, with |J | = j, such that the membership of a set S in J depends only on S ∩ J . In this paper we provide a simple description of intersecting families of sets. Let n and k be positive integers with k < n/2, and let A be a family of pairwise intersecting subsets of {1, . . . , n}, all of size k. We sh...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0279-0750
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12123