Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rotten Spouses, Family Transfers and Public Goods
Rotten Spouses, Family Transfers and Public Goods We show that once interfamily exchanges are considered, Becker’s rotten kids mechanism has some remarkable implications that have gone hitherto unnoticed. Specifically, we establish that Cornes and Silva’s (1999) result of efficiency in the contribution game amongst siblings extends to a setting where the contributors (spouses) belong to differe...
متن کاملPublic Transfers and Marital Dissolution
In this paper we analyse determinants of marital dissolution. The focus is on the alleged influence from public transfers, including governmental transfers directed towards divorced families, child allowance, and child support awards. We use a Norwegian panel of 2.800 couples who were married in 1989, together with a broad range of socio-economic variables, including (expected) public and priva...
متن کاملDynamic Aspects of Family Transfers
Parents transfer a great deal to their adult children, yet we know little about the dynamic aspects of these transfers. Here I posit a dynamic altruistic model to explain parental giving. I then examine transfers over 17 years and find substantial changes in recipiency both across periods and among siblings, and a strong negative correlation between transfers and transitory income. I also find ...
متن کاملInformal insurance, public transfers and consumption smoothing
In many developing countries, public programs in the form of food aid distribution and food-for-work programs are often meant to protect vulnerable households from consumption and nutrition downturns by providing a safety net. Few studies have evaluated the impact of these programs. Furthermore, households often use a variety of informal mechanisms to cope with risk, including mutual support an...
متن کاملIncome Transfers, Welfare and Family Decisions
Income Transfers, Welfare and Family Decisions This paper studies the effects of different income transfers on individual welfare, in both marriage and divorce situations, and on family decisions. We assume three generations within the family. We develop a sequential game that, in a first stage, determines the optimum level of the transfer within a relationship of one-sided altruism. In the sec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0347-0520,1467-9442
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00303