Are epistemic reasons normative?

نویسندگان

چکیده

According to a widely held view, epistemic reasons are normative for belief – much like prudential or moral action. In recent years, however, an increasing number of authors have questioned the normativity reasons. this article, I discuss important challenge anti-normativism about and present series arguments in support normativism. The is say what kind if they not various answers find them all wanting. normativism each stress certain analogy between Just action, provide partial justification; premises correct reasoning; constitute good bases responses for; which agents can show these without committing mistake. case, argue that relevant condition plausibly sufficient reason, any case better position explain than anti-normativism.

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or nonmental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two proble...

متن کامل

Exceptional Cases: Epistemic Contributions and Normative Expectations

Exceptional cases are at odds with the typical: they stand out as bizarre and rare. What then could justify their systematic analysis? Elaborating the analytical distinction between anomalies, exceptions and outliers, this paper outlines three potential epistemic contributions of exceptional cases. First, exceptional cases reveal the limits of standard classification categories. In so doing, th...

متن کامل

John Turri, "The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons"

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two probl...

متن کامل

Are epistemic emotions metacognitive?

This article addresses the question whether epistemic emotions (such as surprise, curiosity, uncertainty, and feelings of knowing) are in any sense inherently metacognitive. The paper begins with some critical discussion of a recent suggestion made by Joelle Proust, that these emotions might be implicitly or procedurally metacognitive. It then explores the theoretical resources that are needed ...

متن کامل

Unreasonable reasons: normative judgements in the assessment of mental capacity

The recent Mental Capacity Act (2005) sets out a test for assessing a person's capacity to make treatment choices. In some cases, particularly in psychiatry, it is unclear how the criteria ought to be interpreted and applied by clinicians. In this paper, I argue that this uncertainty arises because the concept of capacity employed in the Act, and the diagnostic tools developed to assist its ass...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Noûs

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1468-0068', '0029-4624']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12379