Archipelago Capitalism: Tax Havens, Offshore Money, and the State, 1950s–1970s
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Honor among Tax Havens
This note presents a simple, partial equilibrium model of the supply of offshore tax havens, when multinationals are capable of sheltering some of their worldwide income. It provides a few contrasting predictions to those in “Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens” by Slemrod and Wilson. Slemrod and Wilson model tax sheltering as a production process which uses up scarce resources in the tax...
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— The stock of wealth held offshore is estimated at US$6 trillion. Many small island economies (SIEs) host offshore finance centers, and some SIEs are highly dependent upon offshore finance. Extreme examples have over 90% of government revenues derived from finance sector activities. Since 1998 a series of international initiatives have been launched to combat harmful tax practices, money laund...
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This paper investigates whether tax havens have an incentive to maintain low regulatory standards in order to attract black money activities. Using a new dataset on money laundering regulation, the results of this study show that tax haven and money laundering services coincide within the same country. This effect is especially observable for regulative instruments which increase the probabilit...
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⁎ Corresponding author. Stephen M. Ross School of Bu 701 Tappan Street, Rm. R5396, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1 936 3914; fax: +734 936 8716. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Slemrod). 1 The OECD report distinguished tax havens from significant revenues from the income tax but have prefe kinds of income, generally restricted to non-residents; about the kind of tax haven covered by the OECD's def...
متن کاملTax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment
In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of pro t shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative scal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contrib...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The American Historical Review
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0002-8762,1937-5239
DOI: 10.1093/ahr/122.5.1431