Analyst Coverage And The Diversification Discount

Analyst Coverage and the Glamour Discount

Does Diversification Cause the "Diversification Discount"?

Using recent econometric developments about causal inference, I examine whether diversification destroys value. I estimate the value effect of diversification by matching diversifying and single-segment firms on their propensity score-the predicted values from a probit model of the propensity to diversify. I also use Heckman 's (1979) two-stage estimator for comparison purposes. Ifind that on a...

Stock trading and diversification discount

While explicitly assuming that stock price conveys valuable information to the management, we show that the value loss from diversification is a function of the stock price informativeness. More informed stock trading leads to a more efficient investment and a smaller diversification discount. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management

Do analysts serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? This study examines the role analysts play in corporate governance by focusing on the effect that their scrutiny has on earnings management. Controlling for other firm characteristics, including institutional ownership, I find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. To add...

On Diversification Discount – the Effect of Leverage

This paper identifies a key cause for the documented diversification discount, namely diversified firms being traded at a discount relative to focused firms. We attribute such empirical findings to different distributions of diversified firms vis-à-vis focused firms over leverage in the data sample. We replicate Lang and Stulz’s (1994) and Berger and Ofek’s (1995) main results using a sample fr...