Analyst Coverage and Corporate Environmental Policies

Corporate Strategy, Analyst Coverage, and the Uniqueness Paradox

In this paper we argue that managers confront a paradox in selecting strategy. On the one hand, capital markets systematically discount uniqueness in the investment strategy choices of firms. Uniqueness in strategy heightens the cost of collecting and analyzing information to evaluate a firm’s future value. These greater costs in strategy evaluation discourage the collection and analysis of inf...

Does Greenness Matter? Environmental Performance, Ownership Structure and Analyst Coverage

We examine how the ownership, analyst coverage and stock market valuation of a sample of U.S. firms vary with their environmental performance. Both “green” and “toxic” firms have a larger number of shareholders but a smaller percentage of institutional owners and ownership stakes relative to environmentally neutral firms. Nonetheless, toxic firms have higher institutional ownership than green f...

Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management

Do analysts serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? This study examines the role analysts play in corporate governance by focusing on the effect that their scrutiny has on earnings management. Controlling for other firm characteristics, including institutional ownership, I find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. To add...

The Effect of Analyst Coverage on Corporate Voluntary Disclosure, Price Effi ciency and Liquidity

“ Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management ” on

This study investigates the effect of analyst coverage on both accrual-based and real earnings management. Regarding accrual-based earnings management, I find that firms followed by more analysts engage in less accruals management and that more experienced analysts seem to be more effective in constraining accruals management, consistent with the role of analysts as external monitors to manager...