An Overview on Contracting Theory and Agency Theory: Determinants of Voluntary Public Accounting Firms Switching
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: KnE Social Sciences
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2518-668X
DOI: 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3381