An empirical examination of moral hazards and adverse selection on PPP projects
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Crop Insurance and Crop Production : An Empirical Study of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
anonymous referee for helpful comments and criticism.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Engineering, Design and Technology
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1726-0531
DOI: 10.1108/jedt-01-2018-0001