An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism
نویسندگان
چکیده
The primary goal of this paper is to provide substantial motivation for exploring an Acquaintance account phenomenal consciousness, on which what fundamentally explains consciousness the relation acquaintance. Its secondary take a few steps towards such account. Roughly, my argument proceeds as follows. Motivated by prioritizing naturalization, debate about nature has been almost monopolized representational theories (first-order and meta-representational). Among them, Self-Representationalism far most antecedently promising (or so I argue). However, thorough inspection, turns out not explanatorily or theoretically better than Indeed, latter seems be superior in at least some important respects. Therefore, very least, there are good reasons into serious consideration alternative theories. positive contribution sketch explained partly representationalist terms, but where crucial role played
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Studies
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1573-0883', '0031-8116']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01868-5