Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider multi-choice cooperative games with a permission tree structure. Multi-choice are generalization of transferable utility in which each player has several activity levels. In addition, structure models situation needs from another to cooperate. this framework, the influence on possibility cooperation may have interpretations depending context. paper, we investigate these and introduce for them new allocation rule that axiomatically characterize.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Operations Research
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1572-9338', '0254-5330']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04953-4