Agricultural contracts, adverse selection, and multiple inputs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Agricultural contracts, adverse selection, and multiple inputs
A significant and growing share of US agricultural output is produced under a production or marketing contract. An important controversy regarding agricultural production contracts is the control of non-labor inputs. Over time, contracts have tended to place more inputs under the buyer’s control and fewer under the farmer’s. This analysis examines the welfare effects of this trend. In the frame...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Agricultural and Food Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2193-7532
DOI: 10.1186/s40100-016-0063-8