Addressing Algorithmic Tacit Collusion: Insights from Market Investigations
نویسندگان
چکیده
This article explores the concept of algorithmic tacit collusion and potential role market investigation tools in addressing this issue. The use algorithms online sales markets has raised concerns about anti-competitive effects adequacy current competition law provisions. European Commission been considering implementation a 'New Competition Tool' (NCT) to address structural issues beyond scope existing regulations. UK's tool, regulated under UK Enterprise Act 2002, serves as reference point for examining insights lessons that could inform development NCT at EU level. highlights impact pricing on transparency, challenges classifying collusion, investigations competition-related concerns. It also discusses procedural safeguards embedded system benefits proactive promotion through investigations. Finally, considers implications adopting similar level enhancing Commission's enforcement framework.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International journal of law and politics studies
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2709-0914']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32996/ijlps.2023.5.4.1