Adding tournament to tournament: Combining between-team and within-team incentives
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.002