Addendum: A bargaining game analysis of international climate negotiations

A Bargaining Game Analysis of International Climate Negotiations*†‡

Title International Negotiations on Climate Change : A Non - cooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol

We investigate international negotiations on CO2 emissions reduction in the Kyoto Protocol by non-cooperative multilateral bargaining theory. The negotiation model has two phases, (i) allocating emission reductions to countries and (ii) international emissions trading. Anticipating the competitive equilibrium of emissions trading, each country evaluates an agreement of reduction commitments. We...

Determinants of bargaining success in the climate change negotiations

A novel dataset, combining interview data with negotiation delegates and hand-coded data of delegate statements, was used to empirically test six hypotheses about the determinants of bargaining success in the UNFCCC negotiations. The success of a state’s bargaining strategy was evaluated by first measuring the distance from a state’s original position on 8 policy issues (e.g. emissions reductio...

Bargaining Resources and Strategies in Climate Change Negotiations

1 Governments dispose of two instruments – resources and activities to increase their impact in international negotiations. Apart from exogenous negotiation resources such as economic weight, states try to increase their endogenous resources by staffing their diplomatic delegations, by including various representatives of NGOs, research or the business community or by choosing experienced deleg...

International climate negotiations: health to the rescue?