منابع مشابه
Social Norms in Social Insurance
We analyze how insurance arrangements, labor supply, moral hazard and outright cheating are affected by social norms. One question is under what conditions norms may improve social welfare. Another is under what conditions people should be allowed to opt out of social insurance. We introduce an informal production sector to analyze the consequences of alternative assumptions about the informati...
متن کاملActive Unemployment Insurance
Active Unemployment Insurance The paper argues that a comprehensive activation strategy is called for – in both unemployment and disability insurance – to minimize the conflict between income insurance and work incentives and to prevent the economic crisis from causing a long-lasting decline in labor force participation. A review of recent empirical evidence, particularly from the Scandinavian ...
متن کاملPolitically sustainable social insurance
Private information underpins a basic social trade-off between incentives and inequality. Normative models of dynamic incentive provision explore the optimal evolution of this trade-off. Many prescribe relentlessly increasing levels of inequality. Indeed, under a variety of standard preference assumptions, an immiseration result obtains: a privileged measure zero set of agents obtain all resour...
متن کاملPolitically Credible Social Insurance
This paper considers political credibility of allocations in settings with dynamic private information. It embeds a benchmark dynamic moral environment into political economy games which feature repeated voting over mechanisms. Optimal politically credible allocations are shown to solve virtual planning problems with social discount factors in excess of the private one. JEL codes: C73, D72, D82...
متن کاملVoluntary Social Insurance ∗
We look at the consequences of allowing social insurance to be voluntary when its coverage can be supplemented in the market. Social insurance pools risks and social contributions are increasing in income, while the market is affected by adverse selection. We claim that making social insurance voluntary does not lead to its collapse since there are always individuals either benefiting from redi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IZA Journal of Labor Policy
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2193-9004
DOI: 10.1186/2193-9004-1-8