Accidentally True Belief and Warrant

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چکیده

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Accidentally True Belief and Warrant

The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many other externalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga’s latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it...

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This report will be divided into three sections. The first will contain a description of the idea of knowledge as justified true belief (JBT) and the Gettier and Gettier-style objections to it. The second will describe a number of attempts to fix the Gettier problem from a variety of angles, and the third will briefly address the broader question of why this subject has proven so seemingly intr...

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Is knowledge justified true belief?

Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in...

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Knowledge was traditionally held to be justified true belief. This paper examines the implications of maintaining this view if justication is interpreted algorithmically. It is argued that if we move sufficiently far from the small worlds to which Bayesian decision theory properly applies, we can steer between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of skepticism only by explicitly building i...

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(2002a, 183) distinguishes the following four putative uses or senses of 'knowledge': (1) Knowledge = belief (2) Knowledge = institutionalized belief (3) Knowledge = true belief (4) Knowledge = justified true belief (plus) 1 (1) and (2) he characterizes as " loose " uses or senses of 'knowledge'; by 'loose', he means " an extended, technical use that departs from the standard, colloquial senses...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Synthese

سال: 2003

ISSN: 0039-7857

DOI: 10.1023/b:synt.0000004906.81978.84