Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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1 This work was done while George Mailath and Larry Samuelson were visiting the University of Bonn, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowldeged. We thank Ken Binmore for helpful discussions. This is a revision of Section 2 of Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked [2]. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the Uni...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01769254