منابع مشابه
The Ignorant Monopolist Redux
Abstract. The classical problem of the monopolist faced with an unknown demand curve is considered in a simple stochastic setting. Sequential pricing strategies designed to maximize discounted profits are shown to converge sufficiently rapidly that they leave the monopolist ignorant about all but the most local features of demand. The failure of the monopolist to “learn” his demand curve would ...
متن کاملRegulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
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متن کاملRegulating a multiproduct and multitype monopolist
I study the optimal regulation of a rm producing two goods. The rm has private information about its cost of producing either of the goods. I explore the ways in which the optimal allocation di¤ers from its one dimensional counterpart. With binding constraints in both dimensions, the allocation involves distortions for the most e¢ cient producers and features overproduction for some less e¢ c...
متن کاملRegulating a monopolist with limited funds
We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efficient types. The third property is full bunching o...
متن کاملRegulating a Monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous studies, we assume demand is influenced by a quality choice, and the firm has private information about its quality capacity in addition to its cost. Under natural conditions, asymmetric information about the quality capacity is irrelevant. The optimal pricing is weakly above marginal costs for a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Islam and Society
سال: 1990
ISSN: 2690-3741,2690-3733
DOI: 10.35632/ajis.v7i2.2792