A Two-Stage Closed-Loop Supply Chain Pricing Decision: Cross-Channel Recycling and Channel Preference

This paper focuses on the pricing problem of a two-stage closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) considering cross-channel recycling and channel preference based single manufacturer traditional retailer. The decision raises from manufacturer’s direct sales retailer’s retailing including recycling. Managers need to focus intelligible management consumer preferences, recovery strategies. According game theory, centralized decentralized CLSC models are used provide an efficient solution managers for problem. model consists differential uniform strategy manufacturer-led Stackelberg, retailer-led Stackelberg Nash equilibrium game, respectively. impact rate profitability in system is explained elaborately this study. results show that rates preferences have significant strategies profit allocation decisions CLSC. It demonstrated different leading manufacturers retailers choices. Manufacturer’s decreases when constant increase. Retailer’s remains stable as has less affected it. Furthermore, if increase, then increases. information will be helpful guideline manager select suitable company scenario.