منابع مشابه
A Theory of Political Polarization*
We present a simple theory of voters’ preferences over representatives, assuming that a representative will vote on one’s behalf. Few, if any elected representatives are capable of unilaterally implementing their platforms: rather, they choose between options generated by other actors and/or external events. When this is the case, voters’ preferences over candidates’ platforms will almost alway...
متن کاملA Political Theory of Populism
When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be inuenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses populistpolicies i.e., policies to the left of the median voter as a way of signaling that he is not from the right. Truly right-wing politicians r...
متن کاملA Theory of Political Entrepreneurship
This paper adapts the entrepreneurial theory developed by Richard Cantillon, Frank Knight, and Ludwig von Mises to the theory of “political entrepreneurship.” Political entrepreneurship is an outgrowth of the theory of the market entrepreneur, and derives from extending entrepreneurial theory from the market into the political sphere of action. By applying the theory of the entrepreneur to poli...
متن کاملA theory of political gridlock
This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties’ popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties’ actions. There is an election scheduled at a future date and th...
متن کاملA Theory of Political Transitions
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0013-0133,1468-0297
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12215