A note on evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A note on evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics.
In 1974 J. Maynard Smith introduced the fundamental notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in order to explain the evolution of genetically determined social behaviour within a single animal species. If the possible pure strategies for contests within a species are 1,2, . . ., ~1, and if A = (aij) is the payoff matrix, then aij is the payoff for the pure strategy i played against the...
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15 صفحه اولA Note on the Computational Hardness of Evolutionary Stable Strategies Draft
We present a very simple reduction that when given a graph G and an integer k produces a game that has an evolutionary stable strategy if and only if the maximum clique size of G is not exactly k. Formally this shows that existence of evolutionary stable strategies is hard for a complexity class called co − D, slightly strengthening (and greatly simplifying) the known NP-hardness and co-NP-hard...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Biology
سال: 1979
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/0022-5193(79)90058-4