A model intervenes: the many faces of moral hazard
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Cambridge Journal of Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0309-166X,1464-3545
DOI: 10.1093/cje/bet069