A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of players, and canonical non-cooperative models of bargaining. We consider two restrictions on equilibri...
متن کاملGeorge J . Mailath , and Stephen Morris “ A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information
We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of players, and canonical non-cooperative models of bargaining. We consider two restrictions on equilibri...
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Ce document est publié dans l'intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l'unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. This paper presents preliminary research carried out at...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2171293