A Countermeasure Approach for Brute-Force Timing Attacks on Cache Privacy in Named Data Networking Architectures

One key feature of named data networks (NDN) is supporting in-network caching to increase the content distribution for today’s Internet needs. However, previously cached contents may be threatened by side-channel timing measurements/attacks. For example, one adversary can identify distinguishing between uncached and from node, namely edge NDN router. The attacks mitigated proposed methods effectively. these countermeasures against paradigm, affecting performance. This work studied attack on streaming over applications a capable approach mitigate it. Firstly, recent attack, designated brute-force, was implemented ndnSIM using AT&T network topology. Then, multi-level countermeasure method, detection defense (DaD), this attack. Simulation results showed that DaD distinguishes legitimate nodes. During achieved minimum cache hit ratio (?0.7%) compared traditional (?4.1% in probabilistic ?3.7% freshness) without compromising requests.