A class of non-zero-sum stochastic differential investment and reinsurance games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Automatica
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0005-1098
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2014.05.033