A Bayesian hierarchical model for inferring player strategy types in a number guessing game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Number-Guessing Game
On the TV show “The Price Is Right,” a player tries to win a new car by guessing its price. The price consists of a known number of digits (usually 5). Possibilities (hints) for each digit are revealed to the player. If the player fails to guess at least one correct digit in its correct place during a turn, the player loses. A player who eventually guesses all digits correctly wins the car. For...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Annals of Applied Statistics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1932-6157
DOI: 10.1214/15-aoas830