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**Department of Computer Engineering**

**M.Sc. Thesis**

**Automatic Verification of Authentication Protocols  
using Genetic Programming**

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امضای مدیر گروه

# Dedication

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*To my father, the origin of me, who helped me whenever I needed, the reason that I have not felt any shortage; spiritual or material.*

*To Mohammad Ali (Mahdi), who endured me, and accepted, being far from his grandfather and family only for my eyes.*

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## **Abstract**

Implicit and unobserved errors and vulnerabilities issues usually arise in cryptographic protocols and especially in authentication protocols. This may enable an attacker to make serious damages to the desired system, such as having the access to or changing secret documents, interfering in bank transactions, having access to users' accounts, or may be having the control all over the system. Many methods have been used to verify the cryptographic protocols such as logical, algebraic, inductive, and mathematical complexity methods. Each of these methods has its special shortages, in addition to the general disadvantages of these methods. Nevertheless, no one has tried to use the computational methods as cryptographic protocol's verifiers. In this thesis, we represent genetic programming – a type of computational methods- as a new verification method for the cryptographic protocols. GAProver; new genetic programming based system has been built and successfully used to verify some known authentication protocols. We wish a new horizon would be opened in the field of cryptographic protocol verification because of this effort. Moreover, we believe that further development of this method may solve many problems that encountered by researchers in the field of protocol verification because of the use of formal methods.

**Keywords:** Authentication protocols, Authentication protocol verification, Computational methods, Genetic programming.

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## Abbreviations

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
<b>IT</b>	<b>I</b> nformation <b>T</b> echnology
<b>EA</b>	<b>E</b> volutionary <b>A</b> lgorithms
<b>GA</b>	<b>G</b> enetic <b>A</b> lgorithms
<b>GP</b>	<b>G</b> enetic <b>P</b> rogramming
<b>DES</b>	<b>D</b> ata <b>E</b> ncryption <b>S</b> tandard
<b>AES</b>	<b>A</b> dvanced <b>E</b> ncryption <b>S</b> tandard
<b>RSA</b>	<b>R</b> ivest, <b>S</b> hamir, <b>A</b> dleman
<b>ACP</b>	<b>A</b> lgebra of <b>C</b> ommunicating <b>P</b> rocesses
<b>GAProver</b>	<b>G</b> enetic <b>P</b> rogramming <b>A</b> uthentication <b>P</b> rotocol <b>V</b> erification <b>S</b> ystem
<b>NP</b>	<b>N</b> ondeterministic <b>P</b> olynomial
<b>EKE</b>	<b>E</b> ncrypted <b>K</b> ey <b>E</b> xchange



# **Chapter 1**

## **Introduction**

### **1.1. Authentication Protocols**

The revolution in Information Technology (IT) field in the last three decades has allowed people to engage many new activities in their daily life such as the Internet, wireless communication, and e-commerce. This revolution led to access very critical information, and this access created many advantages and many serious risks. Many of these risks appear because of security breaches, and the cost is often very expensive. One of the main problems is how to authenticate identity of the people that a service is dealing with in a secure way. This problem appears because many of protocols that were thought to be safe for long periods, has been revealed to be unsafe and vulnerable for serious dangers.

Network based authentication mechanism requires a principal to authenticate to a single system either local or remote (BISHOP, 2003). Authentication is used to verify the identity of users in order to control access to resources, to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to the system and to record the activities of the users in order to hold them accountable for their activities (Matthew, 2002). This is the reason why external entity must provide information to enable the system to confirm its identity. Authentication process consists of obtaining the authentication information from an entity, analyzing the data and determines if it is associated with that entity.

The information comes from what the entity knows (Password, secret information), what the entity has (Badge or card), where the entity is (Terminal), and what the entity is (Fingerprint, odour, retina, hand geometry).

## **1.2. Verification of Authentication Protocols**

In cryptographic protocols and especially authentication protocols there is sometimes an opportunity to find some unobserved errors or vulnerabilities. This may enable an attacker to make serious damages to the desired system, such as having the access to or changing secret documents, interfering in bank transactions, having access to users' accounts, or may be having the control all over the system (Whalen, et al., 2005).

A window for formal verification of the protocols has been opened by Needham and Schroeder by reporting that some errors in the security protocols are hard to discover manually (Needham, et al., 1978). After some years, Denning and Sacco have succeeded in building the first formal protocol verifier that discovered an intrusion to the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol (Denning, et al., 1981). After that, many methods have been applied to verify the authentication protocols such as logical methods, algebraic methods, and inductive methods.

Logical methods of protocol verification have been started by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) (Burrows, et al., 1989, 1990). In the same time, Milner opened the way to use the algebra as a formal method of protocol verification by the extension of the capability of process algebra and developing Pi calculus (Milner, 1989, 1990). In 1998, Abadi and Gordon continued Milner's way and added Spi calculus, which had the structures of cryptography (Abadi, et al., 1998). In 1998, Paulson started the use of induction as a technique for the verification of cryptographic protocols was pioneered by using the proof tool called Isabelle, which uses Higher Order Logic (HOL) (Paulson, 1998). Since that time, there are no efforts to solve the problem of verification of protocols in new methods. However, all that has been achieved is to extend these methods and increase their capacity to include new protocols.

## **1.3. Motivation**

In the previous section, a short description for the methods of authentication protocol verification has been mentioned. The common feature of these methods is that nearly all of them are based on symbolic intelligence. As will be discussed later all of these methods has their limitations such as validating the vulnerable protocols to be secure, and proving that formal methods has always have shortcomings in the verification of authentication protocols. These limitations have encouraged us to try the computational methods for the purpose of authentication protocol verification.

In this research, we present a new method for analysis and automated detection of attacks on protocols. Our objective is to identify the possible executions making an

attack to a protocol (if there is any). For this purpose, we applied genetic programming, a systematic method to search the space of all possible protocol executions, to find the possible attack procedures. We apply the proposed method on some two-party shared-key authentication protocols such as a simple challenge-response authentication protocol, Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol, and BAN-Andrew protocol and show that genetic programming could find the attack scenario to this protocol by running in an acceptable time.

For this purpose, first we define a suitable model for our problem and then specify the genetic programming parameters. Then we use this technique to find the possible sequence of steps that an intruder may do to impersonate another agent and so could attack to the protocol.

Briefly, all that we have done is to use a new paradigm to verify the authentication protocols; this method may open a new horizon in the field of protocol verification, and we believe that further development of this method may solve many problems that encountered by researchers in the field of protocol verification because of the use of formal methods.

#### **1.4. The structure of the thesis**

In this chapter and in the rest of this thesis we will refer to the system that we have developed with GAProver (pronounced as Gap Prover), which is derived from **Genetic-Programming Authentication-Protocol Verification**.

In the rest of this thesis, in chapter 2, we will mention the concepts, general hypothesis and goals of authentication protocols, speak about their formal verification methods, and introduce some verification tools based on some of these methods. Firstly, we will light a spot on the general properties of the formal methods. Then we will discuss the formal verification methods including logical methods, algebraic methods, complexity theoretic methods, and the inductive methods. After that, we will give a table of brief history for all of the formal methods. At last, some authentication protocol verification tools based on some of the mentioned methods will be introduced. In the discussion of this chapter, we will give the limitations of the current methods that motivate us to try a different paradigm for the protocol verification.

In chapter 3, we will discuss the evolutionary algorithms as a kind of computational intelligence; the overall procedure of evolutionary algorithms will be discussed. Then we will discuss genetic algorithms as a kind of evolutionary algorithms, in this section we will discuss the genetic algorithms' prototype in detail because it will help us to understand how genetic programming works. Then we will discuss the genetic programming as an

extension of genetic algorithms. In this chapter we also will give an example to understand how genetic programming works.

Chapter 4 is the heart of this thesis. In this chapter, first, we will explain the work of (Tork Ladani, 2005) which defines a framework for modeling and verification of authentication protocols using the intruder Gap-Gift strategy, this model will be the base to develop our authentication protocol verification system (GAProver) based on genetic programming. Then, we will explain how to represent the GAProver as planning problem, then; we will explain how to utilize researching in our planning problem to reach a hybrid system that has an informed search feature. After that, main units of GAProver will be presented with the basic functions of each unit. Then, a genetic programming view of the Gap-Gift model will be discussed in detail. Lastly, we will introduce the complete GAProver system based on genetic programming. We will introduce two possible structures for the GAProver; the first one will be a mono-engine genetic programming system, while the second is a multi-engine genetic programming system.

Chapter 5 is the chapter of tests and experimental results. First, we will introduce the *JGAP*, a java based toolbox for genetic programming, which is the used to implement the GAProver. Then, we will give an overview of how to use GAProver. After that, we will discuss the results of the system tests on three protocols including, a simple challenge-response authentication protocol, Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol, and BAN-Andrew protocol. Lastly, a comparison between the GAProver and two other systems will be done.

In chapter 6, the thesis will be concluded. After that, some ideas will be given about how to continue this work and to improve the GAProver and genetic programming in whole.