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**The Foreign Policy of Russia toward Caucasus  
(2000-2008)**

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*Dedication:*

*To whom are strange to any kind of  
absolutes.*

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## **Abstract**

After the Soviet Union dissolution, a chaotic period was begun in the Russia. Russia lost its glory and felt disgrace. The first group of elites came to power under Yeltsin; they tried to re-define Russia's identity as a European country and build a foreign policy on this baseline. Therefore Russia tried to become closer with the West especially with the U.S.

According to their view the Soviet and Cold War and being a Super Power period was come to end and Russia has to deal with this sorrowful truth and just try to become a normal country like others with comparative power.

Neglecting the Russia's historical legacy, feeling humiliation of the Kosovo war and NATO expansion, broken economy and domestic chaos resulted to shifting ruler elites at the end of 1990s. New president, Vladimir Putin, tried to change Russia's view on itself and the "Others". Putin wanted to restore Russia's "National Identity" as a great power and return Russia's historical sphere of influence in the Near Abroad.

To doing so, Russia should recover its economy by modernizing it, increasing oil and gas prices and Russia's vast natural resources paved Putin's way to achieve such goals. Then to recover Russia's position in the international arena and for being more assertive, Putin tried to restore Russia's sphere of influence in the Near Abroad. Therefore Near Abroad (especially Caucasus) was tighten with Russia's national identity to define itself as a great power. It seems that Russia under Putin was successful to convince the rest of the world that Central Asia and Caucasus are still Russia's sphere of influence and Russia does not bear any interference in these area; and countries that try to be more independence from Russia (like Georgia) would be punished.

**Key words:** Foreign Policy, National Identity, Caucasus, Eurasianism

## **Introduction**

This thesis seeks to examine the foreign policy of Russia towards Caucasus during Vladimir Putin's presidency. Moreover, the period of 2000 – 2008 is one of the most important eras for Russian and Caucasus countries relations with the presidency of Vladimir Putin in Russia, since his presidency era shows significant changes in Russia's foreign policy. However, this study will not analyze pre-2000; instead, it will only state certain facts and events that are important to understand the period of 2000 – 2008. The main focus of this thesis will be the period, in which Putin acted as the President of the Russian Federation.

When a states' foreign policy is under examination various variables should be included in the analysis and this complicate the possibility to explain one country's foreign policy; here in the pages coming we have tried to explore Russia's foreign policy and foreign aims through the mental and non-material factors.

Each foreign policy derives from the state and people's normative system, which is, most of the times, presented in the state constitution or other official documents or even in states' history presentations. In the Russian case these values are strictly linked to the Russian history, when Russia was a grand nation that decided on all worlds' affairs, similarly Russians interpreted the position of the Russia state in this view.

Russia's instability after the Soviet dissolution, in 1990s, have had made a significant turmoil in Russia's foreign policy. This was because of unclear national identity and national interest definition among Russian political elites. They were confused to answer to the new question, is Russia belong to the West or East?

The first group of Russian political elites under Yeltsin (Westerners) chose a pro-western foreign policy and defined Russia's national identity as a western country. According to this definition Russia tried to build a good and normal relation with the Western countries, especially U.S.A, and forget the Cold War. The other wing was strongly against with this

view; they (Eurasians) acclaimed that Russia was, is and will remain a super power. Putin was belonging to the lately group that tried to restore the Great Power status of Russia.

Putin shifted the foreign policy of Russia to a strong and certain one aiming maximum economic benefits. As Freedman says, Putin's foreign policy has been aimed at strengthening the Russian economy in the hope that, in the not too distant future, Russia might regain its status as a great power (Freedman, 2003, p32). With new foreign and domestic policies in Russia, Putin brings political and economic stability. Therefore, many Russians start to refer Putin as the New Russian Tsar.

In the 1990s the conception of Russia as the big nations vanished and its position in the international community was not more self-evident. In 2000, when Putin took the power, the state structure tried to re-emerge the conception of Russia as the grand nation, preparing strategies for the Russian "coming-back" in the international arena, and using different means, whose primary goal was the reposition of Russia as a superpower.

However, the first step of the Russian repositioning in the international arena was the internal consolidation of the Russian state. Consequently the period of Putin can be divided in two sub-periods: The first period was Russian internal consolidation and empowerment and entrustment of the executive power, especially Putin's (period 2000–2004), and the second was, Increase of Russian involvement in external/world affairs (2004–2008). The empowerment of Putin was generated by its action in Chechnya (the second war started in August 1999) and this war (among other actions) assured Putin's second mandate.

The Chechnya war had two impacts for the internal politics and for the external one. The internal effect was the consolidation of Putin's power, because victory over Chechnyans gave a new impetus to Russian self-confidence and increased the national homogeneity. Putin was, in internal policy, seen as the Redeemer. Consequently this euphoria gave more and more power to Putin's administration and free hands in deciding whether some measures are people friendly or unfriendly. On the other hand, The Chechnya war demonstrated to the world that Russia became a phoenix, and that its actions in the future, under the new president, will not be the same, and that negotiations with Russia will become a hard work.

Increasing the price of oil and gas facilitated Putin's way to make Russia more assertive in international arena. Proven reserves of gas in Russia are around 1,700 trillions of cubic feet of gas, comparing to USA that has 180 trillions of cubic feet and Saudi Arabia that has 230 trillions of cubic feet of gas. Cognizant of such enormous quantity of natural gas Russia decided to use it as an instrument to reaffirm its position in the international community. After the "Color Revolution" Russia enhanced the usage of energy as a tool for reaffirmation of Russia in the international relations.



Here in the pages coming we are trying to explore the following questions:

1. Why does Russia see the region as its sphere of influence?
2. What was Putin's strategy and school of thought in Russia's foreign policy?
3. What are the Russia's main tools and obstacles for achieving its goals in the region?

Also our hypothesis will be:

1. It seems that Russian foreign policy will be explained within the framework of "Official Eurasianism".
2. It seems Russia sees the Expanding of NATO and west countries influence in the region as the most important threat for its position in the world.
3. It seems that to re-building Russia's empire, this region should remain under Russia's dominances.

It's noteworthy that the study will use the description and explanatory method as research method. By utilizing related researches and academic works, we will discuss causes that shaped Russia's outlook to the region.

The study will tries to examine the national identity and domestic political dominant discourse (Eurasianism) under the presidency of Putin as independent variable and Russia's foreign policy toward Caucasus (under Putin), as dependent variable; in other word this thesis argue that national identity is a key factor in determining foreign policy behavior.

Key word definition:

**National identity:** National or collective identity takes the relationship between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification. Identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether. Self is "categorized" as "Other" (Wendt, 1999, p 229).

**Eurasianism:** a school of thought which has its philosophical origins in German idealism in 19<sup>th</sup> century; Eurasians argued for emergence of a Eurasian federation and for adoption of

dual identities (Bjelakovic, 2000, pp 95-98). all the ideas of this school of thought are built upon a notion, which is Russia being a distinct culture, neither East nor West, with a stabilizing role as a bridge state between the two (Broitman, 2009, pp 15-22). In order to maintain this equilibrium, Russia must retain *Derzhava*, or great power status. This school was dominant discourse in Russia during Putin's era.

**Caucasus:** The name Caucasus is the Latinized form of the Greek word *Kaukasos*, but its origin is highly debated. The Caucasus is customarily divided into a northern part and a southern part. In the narrow physical-geographical sense the Caucasus denotes only the main Caucasian range. In a broader and more commonly used sense, it is the bridge between Europe and Asia and comprises an area of 440,194 km<sup>2</sup>. The region occupies a strip of land of 700 to 900 km wide and stretches some 720 km north to south, lying between the 39th and 47th parallels. The borders of the Caucasus are the Kuma–Manych depression to the north, the Caspian Sea to the east, the border of Georgia–Armenia–Azerbaijan with Turkey–Iran to the south; and the Black Sea and Sea of Azov to the west (Coene, 2010, pp: 3-4). This study will explore the Russia's foreign policy toward three southern Caucasian countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Northern Caucasus is beyond the scope of the study.

**Foreign policy:** Foreign policy represents the decisions and course of action taken by a government in regard to its relations with other nations. The objectives of a foreign policy are to protect the interests of the country and promote its self-interests in the international arena. The decision makers of the foreign policy take into account the demands of the individuals and groups in the homeland, bureaucracy, as well as their own perceptions and point of views. Foreign policies generally are designed to help protect a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through aggression, war, and exploitation. a theory of foreign policy is a theory of why particular states make particular foreign policy moves at particular times (Fearon, 1998, p 297).

## **Chapter one:**

### **The roots of Russia's foreign policy**

**The state whose prospective rulers come to their duties with least enthusiasm is bound to have the best and most tranquil government, and the state whose rulers are eager to rule the worst (Plato, 1955, p285)**

## **Introduction**

The Russian state was historically not constructed as a state of the Russian nation understood as a political community in itself, but as an imperial aggregation of territories and people who were expected to display loyalty to the Tsar. Where are the territorial boundaries of Russian state and who belongs to that said territory?

In contrast with the experiences of most other empires, where the formation of the national identity of the metropole preceded empire-building, the formation of the modern Russia nation coincided with colonial expansion. The image that most Russians had of their homeland was based on the conception of Russia as a multiethnic, rather than a specifically Russian empire. This ideology was deeply enforced during Soviet times as well and the Russian were encouraged to identify the Soviet Union as their homeland (smith, 1999b).

In 1919 when Russia was in the midst of its Civil War, developments in the country in many ways followed by the 1990s scenario. The main difference was that they were much more rapid and catastrophic than 1990 decade. In February 1917, the imperial government had collapsed almost overnight, with practically no resistance. In a similar way, the communist regime ended in 1991. In both of these cases, the events were celebrated as the beginning of a new era, an era of happiness and ideal democracy, and that success in all directions would follow(Dugin, 2001, pp: 29-37 ).

In both 1917 and 1991 the economy entered a speedy decline and the state disintegrated while the spread of crime and other social problems provided a great push toward anarchy, as did the presence of civil war and Chechnya in post 1991. In both eras, a similar uprising therefore developed among Russian who blamed western ideology for their country's stagnation (Billington, 2004).

With the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russian political elites were faced with the question of whether the new Russia would cast off the legacy of the Soviet and Tsarist past or carry that legacy forward in whole or in part. The significance of

Russian Question is commonly understood as a set of dilemmas about the nature of the Russia identity and its relationship to the Russian state (Ingram, 2001, pp: 197-219).

The question of Russia's identity—what sort of state Russia would be and what it wanted?—pervaded the political discourse. Should Russia seek to “return to Europe,” as many of its post communist neighbors sought to do? Should it rebuild the Soviet Union? Should Russia be a liberal market democracy or a post-authoritarian regime attempting to modernize along Chinese lines?

To address these questions, this study argues that national identity is a key factor in determining foreign policy behavior. Members of the political elite develop aspirations based on common historical memories. Motivated by value rationality and the need for collective self-esteem, they introduce competing national self- images into the political discourse. National self-images are sets of ideas about the country's political purpose and international status. Members of the political elite propagate national self-images in an effort to define the national identity and interest.

### **The crisis of National Identity in Russia**

National self-images are candidate national identities at play in political debate at any given time. Like national identities, national self-images consist of ideas regarding a state's international status and its political purpose. They entail prescriptions regarding what the country should be and do, in other words the country's substantive national interests and its interests in behaving in particular ways in its external relations (Legro, 2000,pp:419-32).

National identity is impossible to separate from history; but even more so, it is impossible from what each country chooses to focus upon within its history. Selection and interpretation of history, used to bolster national identity, greatly affects how each country orients its foreign policy, foreign policy in turn, is very much about protecting national interests and projecting them onto an international scale.

Foreign policy depends upon a shared sense of national identity which in turn determines other important issues, such as what states are viewed as friends or enemies, what the national interests are and what the aspiration of the state are. States act as “power projectors”. These actors act outside of their legal territory with the goal of affecting the world order and are laden with ideological assumptions (Houweling and Parvizi Amine, 2004, pp: 9-16)

If one national self-image succeeds in dominating public discourse over time, it becomes institutionalized not only in the form of domestic laws, regulations, and symbolic and

governmental structures but also as stable expectations of rights, privileges, jurisdictions, obligations and norms of behavior in relations with other states and among domestic societal actors. The ideas it entails about the state's international status and political purpose become national interests—values to be upheld, defended, and projected.

Other national self-images will continue to exist and be debated in the political discourse, but unless they displace the dominant national self-image in appearing to offer historically appropriate and practical means to fulfill aspirations, and thus enhance collective self-esteem, they are unlikely to be salient for the majority and therefore unlikely to shape national interests (Citrin, and Duff 2001, pp: 71–100).

A national identity has been established when a particular national self-image consistently dominates the political discourse for an extended period of time. Five years is tentatively set as the minimum length of time required for a national self-image to dominate and begin to become institutionalized as a collective identity. The issue of the timing and pace of identity change is unresolved in the literature, with some arguing that identities change very slowly, if at all, and others arguing that identities can change quite quickly and episodically. Social identities, like social institutions, can collapse quite suddenly, but that does not imply that others immediately take their place or replace all their content (Pierson, 2004).

Political purpose encompasses beliefs about the appropriate system of political and economic governance for one's country and whether this system is also universally appropriate. Political purpose includes ideas about what values, principles, traits, and symbols characterize the country and what values and principles should govern relations between countries. It also involves ideas about what the country's national mission is, if there is one. For instance the United States might have a political purpose of "promoting political and economic freedom at home and abroad." The Russian Federation might have a political purpose of "becoming a Western country" or "protecting all Slavs" or "restoring the Soviet Empire."

The second pillar on which national identity rests is international status. International status includes questions of rank, of the positioning of one's country in an imagined international hierarchy of political, military, social, and economic power. Such ranking involves evaluations of the material power possessed by oneself and all other parties. Status includes immaterial factors as well. For example, citizens of the United States often claim that their country is the "leader of the free world." International status involves ideas about the proper position, respect, deference, rights, and obligations that one's country should be accorded, based on the groups one believes it belongs to; not only the amount of material power it does or does not have purpose also indicates whether a country is a status-seeker or a status maintainer with regard to a particular issue or a group. A country that seeks to join the group of advanced industrial countries or the group of "civilized

countries” is a status-seeker, whereas a state that recognizes itself as being an advanced industrial country or a civilized country is a status maintainer (Clunan, 2009).

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused massive disruption to the prevailing Soviet identity and produced for many a sense of loss. According to constructivism, this period of identity crisis should motivate Russian political elites to find new bases of collective self-esteem in ways that promote their particular values and yield multiple ideas of the post-Soviet national self-image (Ibid, pp: 39-50). The post-Soviet period offers ample evidence of Russian political elites’ search for a new basis for national self-esteem.

The majority of Russians regretted the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Soviet republics from Soviet / Russian rule, (Escobar, 2005, p 37-40) setting them up to view their current position as one of loss and to aspire to regain what had been lost.

This regret was higher among the mass public than among the elite; 69 percent of respondents in a survey of the general public expressed regret in 1992 that the USSR was no more exist. This sense of regret remained as the post-Soviet period lengthened, with approximately 65 to 75 percent of political elites regretting the Soviet collapse in 2001 (Clunan, 2009, pp: 123-130).

The common-aspirations suggested by the sense of loss were restoring Russia’s status as a great power and recreating in whole or part Russia’s role as the guiding force among the former Soviet republics. The most commonly held historical aspirations among political elites concerned Russia’s status as a great power—a status premised on Russia’s modernity (Larson and Shevchenko 2003, pp: 77–109).

Russia’s quest for great power status has a long historical pedigree. Shared memories of Russia’s past status as a great power—whether global, European, or Eurasian—created a core aspiration among most political elites to retain or regain that status. The USSR’s status as a great power had not been discredited. Almost all political elites viewed Russia’s past status as a great power positively and as a core facet of Russian identity (Kullberg, 1993).

In the spring of 1993, 95 percent of political elites aspired for Russia to be a major international power, 59 percent thought Russia should be one of the five great powers or a superpower; 30 percent thought it should be one of the most advanced countries in the world (Ryan, 1993, p 18).

Post-Soviet Russian political elites were clearly split over what Russia’s national identity should be in the aftermath of collapse of the Soviet Union. They evinced little agreement on Russia’s political purpose or sources of national self-esteem beyond great power status. Russian political elites proposed a myriad of new types of social order for post-Soviet Russia, Many have characterized this split as a renewal of the nineteenth century debate among the Russian intelligentsia between Westernizers and Slavophiles.



The West in its general and particular forms has been the primary significant “other” for Russian political elites (Neumann, 1996). The West is variously viewed as a developmental or civilizational model to emulate, as a degenerate and dehumanized foil for what Russia should not become, and as a geopolitical or geo-cultural rival. Within the West, Russian elites tend to focus on Western Europe as a political-economic model and the United States as a geopolitical peer in terms of status.

In other words Russian intelligentsias during the centuries have interoperated their system in compare to the West (France, German and after the second world war, United States). Development path and modernization have been the core concept of these debates. Hereafter, this study briefly discuss about different kind of reactions which Russian society showed toward the Western modernization. Each of these discourses have gained dominance in the specific period of the Russian history; and all of them have been a developmental path for Russian society, and have made a special perception of Russia’s national identity.

## **Pro-westerns**

The state agent school of thinking with much longer tradition in Russian history of thought was the Westerners. They emerged at the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century as a reflection of French revolution and Napoleonic wars. It should not be a surprise that many Russian army officers who were by the nature of their service exposed to west during the Napoleonic wars admired liberalism and were following of enlightenment and romanticism. Most visible political manifestation of Westernize was Decembrists coup attempt in 1825.

The philosophical origins of westerners were in rationalism, the notion of modernization and a faith in progress. Their goal was to modernize Russia along the lines of other European state. Westerners shared a belief in need for radical social change and argued for political activism. They requests for liberalism and secularism. Petr Chaadaev was one of the founding fathers of this school of thought (Pirumova, 1990).

In term of its thinking about political systems, Russia was perceived as a backward Eastern despotic state which should reject despotism and develop a parliamentary political system with civil right. While other schools- Slavophil and Eurasians- glorified the past, Westerners neglected it as an empirical one.

During the 1990–1993 periods multiple national self-images came into being. First among them was a Western national self-image, liberal internationalism. When Russia appeared as an independent entity in 1991, the new political leadership led by Boris Yeltsin, Egor Gaidar, and Andrei Kozyrev resoundingly embraced a Western and liberal internationalist

self-image of Russia. However, this national self image was not the only one available to political elites.

The Liberal Westernize conception was the official political discourse from 1990-1992. This typology accepts the boundaries of Russia's new political homeland, and is based on the idea of promoting a civic nation and creating a united identity and commitment to Russia as a political community. The Liberal Westernize typology acknowledges that sovereign nation-state whose citizens are no longer considered Russian (Smith, 1999a).

The Western national self-image has two sub-types: a liberal internationalist self-image, which emphasizes idealism and cosmopolitan interaction and deemphasizes Russia's great power status, and the democratic developmental self-image, which stresses utilitarian interaction and assumes Russia's great power status (Cluna, 2009, pp: 78-89).

Liberal internationalism downplays the utilitarian pursuit of self-interest and Russia's national interests outside of the West. The key assumption drawn from liberal idealism is that a shared belief in democracy creates peace. Seen in this light, rising interdependence requires increased institutionalized cooperation to handle an increasingly broader common fate. The central premise is that Russia's democratic future can only be secured through integration into and cooperation with the West and deemphasizes Russia's great power status.

Correspondingly, Russia should seek political inclusion into all Western and global institutions, including military alliances. Russia should also promote human rights and democracy abroad.

The Western national self-image blames Russia's negative status in the group of great powers on an internal failing: Russia's lack of Western political and economic credentials and the destructive legacy of the Soviet militarized economy and its messianic mission. However, it shares with all the other self-images the belief that the West, particularly the United States, does not treat Russia due its status (Breslauer, 2000, pp: 35-58).

For Westerners, the aspiration is to more fully join the West and Europe, including its military alliances, and to be part of the club of Western market democracies. Russia's great power status is dependent on its transformation into a stable, prosperous democracy.

## **Slavophilism**

Slavophilism developed during the nineteenth century and represented the Russian theoretical response to western liberalism (Valery, 1994). Philosophical foundation of Slavophilism was built as reaction to the western experiences. This school of thought consequently wanted to avoid mistakes that the west made in its development, and not

necessarily to reject everything western, from that perspective they argued that Russia should pursue a different development path-third way- (Zenkovskii, 1953, p48).

Domestically, Slavophilism represented a response to the failed Decembrist uprising and an acknowledgment of the impossibility of executing western-style revolutionary in Russia. In its core and mainstream interpretation, Slavophilism was anti-individualistic in its social thinking and anti-western in its national thinking (peter, 1961).

Educational and gradual reforms were perceived by Slavophiles as mechanisms of social change. They aimed to preserve traditional social forms of peasant community and to model the state on these traditional forms. In their debate with westerners about the issue of state organization, Slavophiles rejected the idea of constitution. This dispute was often used to undeservedly portray Slavophiles as conservative anti-constitutionalists.

Slavophiles argued that the west does not share the historical path that Russia is following. It was argued that Russian people “preferred the road of inner truth -Christian moral organization of life within the framework of the peasant community- to the external truth - a political and legal organization of society of a western type-(Valery, 1994, p152).

Precisely due to these differences Slavophiles did not see the world as one but as divided. Therefore, Russia was not part of the west, but counterpart to it. This positioning of Russia based on older theological concept of Russia as a “third Rome” (Boropetrovich, 1956, p5). In this concept Russia was perceived as the only truly Christian state, the heir of Jerusalem, Rome and Konstantinopol. Slavophiles thought that this gap between Russia and the west existed due to different spiritual principles.

According to them these principles were patterns of having a society and history different from the west’s (Riasanovsky, 1952). Russian principles were perceived as better and Russia would eventually reconstruct the west for benefit of all mankind. Therefore, Russia as a society was perceived to have the messianic role of saving the mankind.

Slavophil national Self-Image In contrast to the neo-communist images, eschews communism as a model. Bolshevism and communism are viewed as a disruption of traditional Russian communalism. We see this in the words of Viktor Aksiuchits, leader of the Christian Democratic Movement: “The Bolsheviks destroyed the foundations of the Great Russian civilization, Orthodoxy, monarchy, statehood (Russia soldiers went to their death ‘for Faith, Tsar, and Fatherland!’). . . . All that made up the originality and uniqueness of Russia was consistently annihilated by the communists. Thus international communism was the force most hostile to historical Russia” (Cluna, 2009, pp: 95-100).

They believe that Russia’s mission is to lead the Slavic or Eastern Slavic world in reviving and preserving its cultural autonomy vis-à-vis both the secular West and the non-Christian world. Therefore Russia’s role is that of a moral great power, a counterweight to the

secular European great powers, and the leading power in the Eastern Slavic lands. Russia also should take the role of protecting Slavic brethren.

The proper role and mission are found in the Tsarist past, when “Orthodox Messianic” (Moscow is the Third Rome) was the spirit of the state system. This type of self-image views the post-Soviet lands outside of Russia where Russian-speakers predominate to be Russian territory, while the other self-images characterize the entire “near abroad” as Russia’s rightful sphere of influence.

## **Eurasianism**

The theoretical framework that be examined in this study of Russia’s political culture and foreign policy grew out of opposition to westerners, is known as the school of Eurasianism. This school of thought emerged in 1920. Although opposed to communism, they held out hope for the new Soviet regime, since it had reconstructed the Russian empire after a long civil war (Billington, J.H (2004).

Eurasians argued for the emergence of a Eurasian federation and for the adoption of dual identities. This school of thought has its philosophical origins in the German idealism, although not in Kantian one, since they were against cosmopolitanism, but specifically on Hegelian idealism which advocates the concept of idea governing state. Therefore Statism is one of the main characters of Eurasianism. This patrimonial authoritarianism spilled over to Russia’s foreign policy and Russia is only interested in participating in the international community if the relationship can be managed by the Russian government.

The strong component of this school presented its critique of the west. The Eurasians were against communist government in the USSR but they were also against that the policy west pursuing. They argued that the west was only interested in subordinating and exploiting Russia. Therefore the west would not confront communism but would help Russia become more the west (Trubetzkoy, p 244).

They acclaim that the west would try to colonize Russia by offering her aid and by supporting her government until this government reforms Russia according to western patterns. Also the intelligentsia’s perception that Russia has “much to learn from Europe” makes Russia to lose its true nature and independence (Ibid, p 250).

This argument about the body of the state originates from the findings of linguistic and cultural inter-connectedness all over the Eurasian continent. The postulated state, therefore, will be that bigger identity because it encompasses several sets of ties among Eurasian nation, as different to the projects of *Pan-Slavism* and *Pan-Turkism* which link people along only one (linguistic) or two (language and religion) ties. The smaller identity