In this paper, we examine whether the presence of multiple large shareholders alleviates firm’s agency costs and information asymmetry embedded in ultimate ownership structures. We extend extant corporate governance research by addressing the effects of multiple large shareholders on firm’s cost of equity capital—a proxy for firm’s information quality. Using data for 1,165 listed corporations f...

cost by considering earnings quality for accepted companies in tehran stockexchange. this survey investigates a population of 76 companies during the timeperiod of 2009-2014. the results show that under high earnings quality, the marketrisk factor, the book risk to market factor, and the size risk factor have positiveeffects, and the profit risk factor has negative effects on shareholders equit...

cost by considering earnings quality for accepted companies in Tehran StockExchange. This survey investigates a population of 76 companies during the timeperiod of 2009-2014. The results show that under high earnings quality, the marketrisk factor, the book risk to market factor, and the size risk factor have positiveeffects, and the profit risk factor has negative effects on shareholders equit...

In a cross-border takeover, the tax base associated with future capital gains is transferred from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders. Cross-country differences in capital gains tax rates enable us to estimate the discount in the takeover price on account of future capital gains. The estimation suggests that a one percentage point increase in the capital gains tax rate reduces the valu...

Corporations in most countries are run by controlling shareholders, who have substantially smaller cash flow rights than their control rights in the firm. This separation of ownership and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the cost of outside minority investors by diverting resources away from the firm and distorting corporate investment and payout policie...

The paper analyzes the information and agency cost effects of bank equity stakes in a universal banking system where banks can also be shareholders in borrowing firms. We test the agency and signaling hypotheses explaining the bank motivations for holding equity of borrowing firms in the Spanish market and we analyze the share abnormal returns around the announcements of bank equity holdings. T...

Compared with Eq. (32), equity value is reduced by the expected deadweight loss from diversion, (1−qT )(1−λ)XB 1+r . Effectively, shareholders bear the full cost of diversion by paying a high interest rate on debt. It follows that the optimal debt in this range is D∗. It follows that the target chooses between taking high debt D∗ and diverting value from creditors in the bad state and taking lo...

Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Abstract. We use an important legal event as a natural experiment to examine the effect of management fiduciary duties on equity‐debt conflicts. A 1991 Delawar...

ing earnings for shareholders. Return on equity measures net income less preferred dividends against total stockholder’s equity. The three primary drivers of ROE are better sales (or turnover), greater margins and higher debt levels, each of which can lead to a higher ROE. Although return on equity is a useful tool, it does not tell you what factors are helping or hurting the company’s performa...

Given the objective of maximizing the wealth of existing shareholders, this paper discusses some of the issues that arise in attempting to measure the performance of individual businesses within a bank. The paper describes two return measures – return on assets within a business and the return on the ‘equity’ of an individual business – and discusses the appropriate bench-marks. The paper ends ...