background: existence or non-existence of adverse selection in insurance market is one of the important cases that have always been considered by insurers. adverse selection is one of the consequences of asymmetric information. theory of adverse selection states that high-risk individuals demand the insurance service more than low risk individuals do. methods: the presence of adverse selection ...

crop insurance is a main tool for coping up with different adversities in farming. the purpose followed in this study was to identify the major motivating and determinant factors of re-purchase of crop insurance by and among already insured farmers. survey research and multi sectional sampling procedures employed used to select farmers. the sample consisted of two groups of farmers: 1) currentl...

We study the effect of offering index insurance to groups versus individuals on individual’s savings and insurance decisions in a lab experiment in the field, which offers real index insurance. We also look at how the network relationships among dairy farmers in the Dominican Republics affects the demand for group index insurance. Individuals offered group insurance are exogenously grouped acco...

We empirically examine how the decision to purchase private health insurance and hospitalization are made based on labor income, socio-demographic factors, and private health insurance. The increase in household labor income and wealth has a positive effect on purchasing private health insurance. This suggests a supplementary effect for public health insurance under the strict control of a two-...

the purchase of insurance may cause the insureds to increase the costs of insurance companies, compared to their estimation of costs. if after the demand of insurance services, the loss ratio of insurance companies increases because of consumer behavior, moral hazard will be evident. in this paper, after introducing the literature, the presence of moral hazard in iran insurance company is teste...

s: This paper attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of the insurance contracts simultaneously has superior information to the other. We decompose the risk of a policyholder into a general risk and a specific risk. We assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. When each risk can be either hi...