this paper studies effective organizational factors in creating cynicism. at first, we studied the literature of organizational cynicism, dimensions and components of cynicism at different approaches. then among them six component include: perception of organizational support, perception of executives’ compensation, perception of organizational performance, perception of distributive justice an...

The Public Perception and Normative Valuation of Executive Compensation: An International Comparison This paper describes individuals’ perceptions and normative valuations of executive compensation using comparable survey data for fifteen OECD member countries. An overwhelming majority of individuals (more than 90%) believes that top executives earn more than they actually deserve. However, the...

In this paper, I analyze how the influence of executives affects the compensation decisions of boards of directors. Boards vary in their degree of independence, and compensation decisions not only serve to motivate executives and allocate rents, but also affect a board’s reputation for independence. Although greater managerial influence over the board has the obvious effect of increasing the le...

Allowing CEOs to hedge the risk in the compensation contracts their …rms give them has been controversial because such hedging permits the executives to undo some of the incentive e¤ects of those contracts; it also results in a divergence between the compensation …rms pay their senior executives and the compensation those executives e¤ectively receive. We analyze the personal hedging activities...

Our review of the evidence found that the notion that higher pay leads to the selection of better executives is undermined by the prevalence of poor recruiting methods. Moreover, higher pay fails to promote better performance. Instead, it undermines the intrinsic motivation of executives, inhibits their learning, leads them to ignore other stakeholders, and discourages them from considering the...

Our review of the evidence found that the notion that higher pay leads to the selection of better executives is undermined by the prevalence of poor recruiting methods. Moreover, higher pay fails to promote better performance. Instead, it undermines the intrinsic motivation of executives, inhibits their learning, leads them to ignore other stakeholders, and discourages them from considering the...

We test for information structure in executive compensation. The optimal compensation contract in the principal agent model implies that incentives increase with the level of managerial talent only if information about managerial talent is asymmetric in that executives have better information than shareholders. We find positive relations between the payperformance sensitivity and the level of m...

I study the impact of changes in compensation disclosure on the level and structure of executive compensation. I exploit exogenous variation of compensation information among executives after a corporate governance reform in Germany in the late 2000s. The reform, for the first time in Germany, required firms to publicly disclose the individual compensation packages of key executives. Prior to t...

Excerpt] This paper presents estimates of the relationship between the performance and compensation of local building trades union leaders. A growing literature has revived the common-sense notion that organizations should structure the compensation of both their employees and their executives so as to encourage them to take actions consistent with the goals of the organizations. One way to min...