We study mechanisms where a player’s strategy is one of his possible (payoff) types and at least one player is Knightian, that is, cannot distinguish which element of a “candidate set” with multiple types is his true type. We call such a mechanism Knightian truthful if, in all its rational plays, every player reports his own true type, if he knows it exactly, and a type in his candidate set, if...

We study the geometrical shape of the partitions of the input space created by the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with multidimensional types and additive quasilinear utilities. We introduce a new method for describing the allocation graph and the geometry of truthful mechanisms for an arbitrary number of items(/tasks). Applying this method we characterize all p...

It seems to be a platitude that belief is governed by a norm of truth. Isn’t the point of belief to believe truths ? Isn’t it a requirement of believing that we should not believe falsehoods? A number of philosophers, however, deny this. Although they recognise that there is an intimate connection between belief and truth, they reject the idea that this connection is normative. Indeed, they tel...

Recently, there has been a number of papers relating mechanism design and privacy (e.g., see [MT07, Xia11, CCK11, NST12, NOS12, HK12]). All of these papers consider a worst-case setting where there is no probabilistic information about the players’ types. In this paper, we investigate mechanism design and privacy in the Bayesian setting, where the players’ types are drawn from some common distr...