This paper presents an efficiency argument that contributes to understand why corporate governance structures with a dominant shareholder are so prevalent in so many countries around the world. In an environment where outsiders cannot accurately monitor the performance of transactions made between firms and stakeholders, the existence of a controlling shareholder who is an insider to the firm’s...

This study aims at determining the personality traits and investment patterns in the stock market and presenting the pattern with a behavioral finance approach. This is an applied, descriptive- survey, and cross-sectional study. The statistical population includes real investors in the Tehran Stock Exchange. The required information was collected using questionnaire and was analyzed using SPSS ...

We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders’ expectations based on publicly available information rather than true income, resulting in an observed income and payout process that adjust...

Corporate law contains two contradictory stories about the role of shareholders. In one, shareholders are a useful countervailing force against self-interested behaviour corporate agents. other, lack motivation, information, and proper incentives to contribute good governance business corporations. Both true on occasion, but is one generally more than other? Currently, developments in securitie...

In the acquisition of listed corporation, the controlling shareholders who either hold a certain number of shares, or play a decisive role in the transfer of corporation control. Compared with the minority shareholders, controlling shareholders often abuse its dominant position to harm other stakeholders' interests of the corporation. Imposing the fiduciary duties to the controlling shareholder...

We develop a dynamic model of firm in which cash management is partially delegated to self-interested manager. Shareholders trade off the cost dismissing manager with managerial discretion over use liquid funds. An improvement corporate governance quality may have positive or negative effect on levels and values balances, depending source improvement. While reduction entrenchment results lower ...

Recent studies in Finance suggest dividends’ role as monitoring mechanism, which allows minority shareholders to control the managers or larger shareholders’ decisions. This paper tests this hypothesis on listed companies at Bucharest Stock Exchange, in 2000-2003 period, from the legislation perspective, but, also, using dividend ratios. Even the regulations and the enforcement of the law seem ...

This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that even without any explicit corporate governance mechanisms protecting minority shareholders, controllin...