Designing simple mechanisms with desirable revenue guarantees has become a major research agenda in the economics and computation community. However, few mechanisms have been actually applied in industry. In this paper, we aim to bridge the gap between the “simple versus optimal” theory and practice, and propose a class of parameterized mechanisms, tailored for the sponsored search auction sett...

nowadays, the internet has had a rapid expansion and presence in all areas of the individuals, institutions, companies and organizations lives. this has made large extent of data available so that the users need to access their desired information or services through using search engines. to continue and promote providing services, search engines require a source of income. sponsored search adv...

when emerging technologies such as search engine marketing (sem) face tasks that require human level intelligence, it is inevitable to use the knowledge repositories to endow the machine with the breadth of knowledge available to humans. keyword suggestion for search engine advertising is an important problem for sponsored search and sem that requires a goldmine repository of knowledge. a recen...

We study the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating robots in real time, where each task has to be assigned to exactly one robot so that the sum of the latencies of all tasks is as small as possible. We propose a new auction-like algorithm, called Sequential Incremental-Value (SIV) auction, which assigns tasks to robots in multiple rounds. The idea behind SIV auctions is to assign as ma...

Motivated by the online advertising exchange marketplace where demand-side intermediaries conduct local upstream auctions and participate in the exchanges’ real-time auctions, we study the revenue and efficiency effects of three different auction mechanisms for such intermediaries. Specifically, we consider the widely-used first-price sealed-bid auction and two variations of the Vickrey auction...

Auctions have been developed for economic transactions with asymmetric information and they are the simplest means of price determination for multilateral trading without ‘market makers.’ During the last years, new technologies gave a boost to the development and usage of innovative auction formats in several fields. We explore some of the new possibilities of applications and explain the diffe...

In recent years, effective sponsored search auctions (SSAs) have been designed to incentivize advertisers (advs) to bid their truthful valuations and, at the same time, to assure both the advs and the auctioneer a non–negative utility. Nonetheless, when the click–through–rates (CTRs) of the advs are unknown to the auction, these mechanisms must be paired with a learning algorithm for the estima...

We analyze symmetric pure strategy equilibria in dynamic sponsored search auction games using simulations, restricting the strategies to several in a class of greedy bidding strategies introduced by Cary et al. We show that a particular convergent strategy, “balanced bidding”, also exhibits high stability to deviations in the dynamic setting. On the other hand, a cooperative strategy which yiel...

Despite attractive theoretical properties, Vickrey auctions are seldom used due to the risk of information revelation and fear of cheating. CVAs (Cryptographic Vickrey Auctions) have been proposed to protect bidders’ privacy or to prevent cheating by the bid taker. This paper focuses on incentive issues for certain CVAs. First, it defines the CVAs of interest and identifies ideal goals for this...