In recent years attempts were made to extend the equilibrium existence results of Gale and Mas-Colell (1975, J. Math. Econ. 2, 9 15) and Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975, J. Math. Econ. 2, 345 348) to continuum economies. Here it is shown that the usual conditions used for these attempts force the ``preferred to'' correspondence to be empty-valued almost everywhere on the nonatomic part of the mea...

We develop an approximation scheme for the quantum mechanics of N D0-branes at finite temperature in the 't Hooft large- N limit. The entropy of the quantum mechanics calculated using this approximation agrees well with the Bekenstein-Hawking entropy of a ten-dimensional nonextremal black hole with 0-brane charge. This result is in accordance with the duality conjectured by Itzhaki, Maldacena, ...

We correct a bound in the definition of approximate truthfulness used body paper Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007). The proof their main theorem uses different permutation-based definition, implicitly claiming that permutation-version implies bound-based version. show this claim holds only if is loosened. new still strong enough to guarantee fraction lies vanishes as number problems grows, so sta...

HRISTOPHER BACHMANN,* ALEXANDER L. KLIBANOV, TIMOTHY S. OLSON, ASON R. SONNENSCHEIN,* JESUS RIVERA–NIEVES,* FABIO COMINELLI,* KLAUS F. LEY, ONATHAN R. LINDNER, and THERESA T. PIZARRO* Division of Gastroenterology and Hepatology/Digestive Health Center of Excellence, Department of Biomedical Engineering, Division of ardiovascular Medicine, and Cardiovascular Research Center, University of Virgin...

Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategyproofness and no-vetoer.