These notes discuss some of the central solution concepts for normal-form games: Nash and correlated equilibrium, iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, rationalizability, and self-confirming equilibrium. Nash equilibrium captures the idea that players ought to do as well as they can given the strategies chosen by the other players. There are two pure Nash equilibria (B, B) and (F,...

Solution concepts in cooperative games are based on either cost games or benefit games. Although cost games and benefit games are strategically equivalent, that is not the case in general for solution concepts. Motivated by this important observation, a new property called invariance property with respect to benefit/cost allocation is introduced in this paper. Since such a property can be regar...

Game theory analyzes the strategic aspects of situations of social interaction by representing them as mathematical structures. Any such structure should at least account for the participants’ powers and their preferences. The way powers and preferences are modelled makes a difference as to which strategic concepts are available for mathematical scrutiny. In strategic games the players’ powers ...

We discuss four solution concepts for games with incomplete information. We show how each solution concept can be viewed as encoding informational robustness. For a given type space, we consider expansions of the type space that provide players with additional signals. We distinguish between expansions along two dimensions. First, the signals can either convey payoff relevant information or onl...