Discriminating raining from non-raining clouds at mid-latitudes using multispectral satellite data T. Nauss and A. A. Kokhanovsky Laboratory of Climatology and Remote Sensing, University of Marburg, Germany Institute of Remote Sensing, University of Bremen, Germany Received: 9 November 2005 – Accepted: 20 December 2005 – Published: 20 February 2006 Correspondence to: T. Nauss ([email protected]) © ...

Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin 'If it is raining and it might not be raining, …' sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin 'If it is raining and I don't know it, …'. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals, according to...

When I tell you that it’s raining, I describe a way the world is—viz., rainy. I say something factual, something whose truth turns on how things are with some aspect of the world. Likewise when I tell you that the weatherman thinks that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on a different feature of the world, namely, the weatherman’s state of mind. Likewise when I tell you that I th...

A global study of the vertical structures of the clouds of tropical mesoscale convective systems (MCSs) has been carried out with data from the CloudSat Cloud Profiling Radar. Tropical MCSs are found to be dominated by cloud-top heights greater than 10 km. Secondary cloud layers sometimes occur in MCSs, but outside their primary raining cores. The secondary layers have tops at 6–8 and 1–3 km. H...

Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsify...

Nor are meta-linguistic claims such as ‘the proposition that Socrates was a philosopher is true’, ‘what John asserted at 3 o’clock on January 15, 2002 is false’, and ‘Since John said that it’s raining on January 15, 2002, and Mary said that it’s not raining on January 15, 2002, John and Mary disagree about whether it is raining on January 15, 2002’. There are two reasons why such talk, in stand...